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Does Bank Capital Matter 
for Monetary Transmission?
Introduction
raditional monetary theory has largely ignored the role of 
bank equity. Bank-centered accounts of how monetary 
policy affects the real economy usually focus on the role of 
reserves and reserve requirements in determining the volume 
of demand deposits and, in the case of the bank lending 
channel, bank loans. As Friedman (1991) observed, 
“Traditionally, most economists have regarded the fact that 
banks hold capital as at best a macroeconomic irrelevance and 
at worst a pedagogical inconvenience.” This stands in stark 
contrast to the importance attached to capital adequacy in the 
regulation of banks, especially since the adoption of the Basle 
Accord in 1988, which established risk-based capital 
requirements in the Group of Ten countries. The imple-
mentation of these regulations, along with other factors, has 
often been blamed for a perceived credit crunch in the United 
States immediately prior to and during the 1990-91 recession, 
giving rise to the term “capital crunch.”1 Research on this and 
other episodes has found that low bank capital is associated 
with sluggish lending.2
Despite this evidence, the role of bank capital and capital 
requirements in the monetary transmission mechanism has 
received much less attention.3 This paper addresses this issue 
by examining how bank capital and its regulation affect the role 
of bank lending in the transmission of monetary policy.4
I argue that taking into account bank capital has some 
interesting implications for our understanding of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. In addition, I briefly discuss whether 
recently adopted and proposed amendments to the Basle 
Accord can be expected to change these implications.
Bank Capital and the
Lending Channel
There are at least two theoretically distinct ways in which the 
level of bank capital can change the impact of monetary shocks 
on bank lending: through the traditional bank lending channel, 
also discussed in this volume by Lown and Morgan (2002), and 
through a more direct mechanism that can be described as a 
“bank capital channel.” Both channels derive from a failure 
of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for banks. In a Modigliani-
Miller world of perfect capital markets, a bank’s lending 
decisions are independent of its financial structure. As the bank 
will always be able to find investors willing to finance any 
profitable lending opportunities, the level of bank capital is 
irrelevant to lending, and thus to the monetary transmission 
mechanism.5 For each channel, this logic fails for a specific 
reason, although the nature of the failure is somewhat different 
in each case. Although the two are by no means mutually 
exclusive, it is easier to discuss them separately.
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According to the bank lending channel thesis, monetary 
policy has a direct effect on the supply of bank loans, and thus 
on the real economy, because banks finance loans in part with 
liabilities that carry reserve requirements.6 By lowering bank 
reserves, contractionary monetary policy reduces the extent to 
which banks can accept reservable deposits, if reserve 
requirements are binding. The decrease in reservable liabilities 
will in turn lead banks to reduce lending if they cannot easily 
switch to alternative forms of finance or liquidate assets other 
than loans. Thus, a necessary condition for a bank lending 
channel to be operative is that the market for nonreservable bank 
liabilities is not frictionless.7 Otherwise, the bank could simply 
offset the decline in reservable deposits by costlessly switching to 
liabilities that carry no reserve requirements or lower reserve 
requirements, such as certificates of deposit (CDs), and there 
would be no reason for the bank to forgo profitable lending 
opportunities due to a binding reserve requirement.
Romer and Romer (1990), among others, claim that banks 
can in fact switch fairly easily to nonreservable liabilities, and 
for this reason they have expressed skepticism about the size of 
the lending channel. Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Stein 
(1998), however, counter (and provide some evidence) that 
this type of Modigliani-Miller logic that Romer and Romer 
appeal to will fail if there is asymmetric information about the 
value of the bank’s assets. In that case, as Stein’s model shows, 
adverse selection leads to a “lemon’s premium” in the market 
for risky bank liabilities. Since most nonreservable bank 
liabilities are not insured, they are therefore at least somewhat 
risky, so the market for them is likely to be imperfect.
This discussion of the lending channel makes no reference 
to bank capital or capital regulation. The reason for this is that, 
in essence, the lending channel occurs because banks face a 
liquidity constraint: if all banks always have sufficient cash or 
liquid securities, or can access a frictionless market for some 
managed liability, there is no lending channel. Nonetheless, 
there are some important connections between the strength of 
the lending channel and the level of bank capital.
First, as noted by Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Kashyap 
and Stein (1994), among others, the lending channel may be 
less potent when bank equity is at or below the regulatory 
minimum for a sizable fraction of banks. This is because with a 
binding risk-based capital requirement, a bank cannot expand 
lending without additional capital. If it is costly to issue risky 
nonreservable liabilities—a prerequisite for the existence of the 
lending channel—then it is certainly costly to issue equity, the 
most junior liability. In the extreme case that equity is provided 
in any given period, shocks to reserves will have no effect on 
lending with a binding capital requirement. An increase in 
bank reserves will still lead to an increase in reservable bank 
liabilities in these circumstances, but these additional funds 
must be put in assets that do not carry a capital requirement, 
such as government securities. They cannot be used to make 
(private) loans. Thus, the lending channel is shut down. In the 
intermediate case in which the marginal cost of issuing equity 
is increasing in the value issued (but not infinite), the lending 
channel will not be shut down completely, but it will be 
diminished in strength. Furthermore, as the discussion of the 
bank capital channel below makes clear, this effect may 
manifest itself even when the capital requirement is not 
currently binding, but may be binding in the future.
This suggests that monetary policy effects on bank lending 
will be smaller when more banks have low capital levels relative 
to the regulatory minimum. Unlike reserves, since there is no 
interbank market for equity, it is therefore not just the average of 
bank capital that matters, but also its distribution across banks.
There is one important caveat to the conclusion that capital 
requirements, when binding, lower the effectiveness of 
monetary policy via the lending channel: the above effect is 
entirely static. If monetary policy actions affect bank profits, 
perhaps through changes in open market interest rates, then 
over time this will accumulate to changes in bank capital. 
Starting from a position of a binding capital requirement, any 
change in bank capital can in turn have a potentially large effect 
on lending. This dynamic effect is essentially the point of the 
bank capital channel, which I discuss in more detail below.
A second way in which bank equity can affect the strength of 
the lending channel is by mitigating the adverse selection or moral 
hazard problems in the market for nonreservable bank liabilities. 
To see this, consider two banks with the same quality assets, but 
different liability structures—bank one, say, has less equity and 
more debt than bank two. Suppose further that, following a 
contractionary monetary policy shock, both banks face an equal 
outflow of reservable deposits.8 Thus, both banks need to issue 
managed liabilities, say, large-denomination CDs, to keep lending 
at a normal level. Even though both banks have equally risky 
assets, bank one’s CDs are more risky because bank one has less 
equity to absorb future losses. Consequently, they are more 
exposed to any asymmetric information problems concerning the 
value of the bank’s assets and thus command a larger lemon’s 
premium. Hence, following the contractionary monetary shock, 
bank one will optimally choose to issue fewer CDs and cut back 
lending by more than the better capitalized bank two. We have 
now reached a seemingly opposite conclusion: the lending channel 
is stronger for banks with lower levels of capital.
It is important to note that for this second effect, it is 
arguably the market value of bank equity that is the relevant 
quantity as the best measure of the bank’s expected future free 
cash flows. For the first effect, which occurs when capital 
requirements are binding, the right quantity is clearly the book 
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The upshot is that the bank lending channel is likely to be 
weaker when 1) among adequately capitalized banks, (the 
market value of) equity is at high levels or 2) the fraction of 
poorly or undercapitalized banks is large. The fact that these 
conditions are somewhat contradictory illustrates the 
importance of taking into account the distribution of equity 
across banks, not just the mean. To the extent that the lending 
channel is economically large, a given change in the federal 
funds rate is likely to have a smaller effect on economic activity 
under these conditions.
The discussion thus far has treated bank capital as given. But 
even in the presence of the type of financial frictions that are 
central to the lending channel and that prevent banks from 
readjusting their capital at any given instant, this cannot be a 
complete analysis. Clearly, in response to economic conditions, 
banks do replenish their equity over time, mainly through 
retained earnings, or pay it out to shareholders as dividends. If 
bank equity responds in a systematic way to monetary shocks, 
then the above conclusions may need to be modified. The fact 
that such a dynamic response is to be expected is one of the 
main points of what I call the bank capital channel.
The Bank Capital Channel
According to the bank capital channel thesis, monetary policy 
affects bank lending in part through its impact on bank equity 
capital. In a separate paper (Van den Heuvel 2001), I present a 
dynamic bank asset and liability management model that 
formalizes this channel and analyzes its consequences for 
monetary policy. Although I refer the reader to that paper for 
the formal analysis as well as for the quantitative results based 
on a calibration exercise, it is useful to summarize the main 
argument. The model incorporates the risk-based capital 
requirements of the Basle Accord and an imperfect market for 
bank equity. These two conditions imply a failure of the 
Modigliani-Miller logic for the bank: the bank’s lending will 
depend on its financial structure as well as on lending 
opportunities and market interest rates. When equity is 
sufficiently low, because of loan losses or some other adverse 
shock, the bank will reduce lending because of the capital 
requirement and the cost of issuing new equity. Even when the 
capital requirement is not currently binding, the model shows 
that a low-capital bank may optimally forgo profitable lending 
opportunities now in order to lower the risk of future capital 
inadequacy. This is interesting since in reality, and in the 
model, as calibrated with U.S. data, most banks are not at the 
capital constraint at any given time.
The latter phenomenon is evident from the chart, which 
presents a histogram of the risk-based total capital ratios 
of U.S. commercial banks for 2000:4, weighted by total assets 
of the banks. For example, the chart reveals that about 
40 percent of the assets in U.S. commercial banks reside in 
banks with a risk-based total capital ratio of between
10 and 11 percent. As we see, there is a fairly wide spread of 
capital ratios across banks, with a mode just above 10 percent 
and relatively few sizable banks below that ratio. Interestingly, 
while the Basle Accord sets an 8 percent minimum risk-based 
ratio for total capital, the 10 percent ratio is one of the main 
minimum requirements a U.S. bank must satisfy to be regarded 
as “well capitalized” according to the Prompt Corrective 
Action provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA).9
Another crucial feature of the model, besides capital 
adequacy regulations and an imperfect market for bank equity, 
is the maturity transformation performed by banks exposing 
them to interest rate risk. A consequence of this is that a 
monetary tightening, by raising the short interest rate, lowers 
bank profits. Unless the bank can reduce dividends 
substantially, this will result over time in lower bank capital 
and, given the failure of the Modigliani-Miller logic, less 
lending. Thus, monetary policy affects the supply of bank loans 
through its effect on bank equity. This dynamic effect—the 
bank capital channel—amplifies the standard interest rate 
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Results from simulating the calibrated model suggest that the 
economic size of the amplification is moderate to large. From the 
perspective of optimal monetary policy, the most interesting 
result is perhaps that the size and the dynamics of the effect are 
highly dependent on the initial level and distribution of capital 
among banks. Intuitively, the reason is that the capital 
requirement affects bank behavior more when bank equity is 
low. Thus, the amplification is much stronger for banks that start 
out with already low capital than for well-capitalized banks, 
although the lending response of banks with inadequate capital at 
the time of the shock will exhibit an initial delay due to the 
binding capital requirement, just as in the case of the bank 
lending channel. Hence, if bank equity is low, the monetary 
policy effects on lending via the bank capital channel may be 
weak initially but will be much larger after several quarters.
It is reassuring that these conclusions are not diametrically 
opposed to those arrived at from the perspective of the bank 
lending channel. There are, however, some interesting 
differences. I will mention two. First, to the extent that the bank 
capital channel is important, we can expect monetary policy 
effects on bank lending not only to vary in strength, but also in 
the timing of their maximum impact. This possibility of “long 
and variable lags” is perhaps not the most comforting 
consideration for central banks.
Second, suppose banks are flush with cash and government-
backed securities but are low on capital, as many U.S. banks 
were in the aftermath of the Great Depression.10 Under those 
conditions, the lending channel is expected to be weak: 
following a monetary tightening, a decline in reservable 
deposits can easily be offset by selling some securities without 
issuing many new CDs, so that the low level of equity is not a 
problem. According to the bank capital channel thesis, 
however, the increase in interest rates will lower bank equity 
even further, causing some banks to cut lending to reduce the 
risk of capital inadequacy. Thus, the latter channel is expected 
to be strong. The fact that banks have a large stock of cash or 
Treasuries, which does not count when computing risk-
weighted assets, is irrelevant when it is a risk-based capital 
requirement that constrains lending.11
A related point concerns what happens if financial markets 
and bank regulation continue to develop in such a way that it 
becomes increasingly less difficult for banks to issue 
nonreservable liabilities. For example, small-denomination 
CDs already carry no reserve requirements, but are insured and 
therefore cannot be subject to a lemon’s premium.12 If banks’ 
ability to rely on such sources of financing increases, the 
lending channel can be expected to diminish in strength. Such 
a development would not affect the bank capital channel, 
however, as long as the frictions in the market for bank equity 
and some form of capital adequacy regulation remain. In other 
words, the latter channel is immune to the aforementioned 
critique by Romer and Romer (1990), unless one believes that 
banks can at any time frictionlessly issue new equity, as 
opposed to nonreservable liabilities.
New Directions of the Basle Accord
The Basle Accord, the basis of the current risk-based capital 
requirements, is in the process of being amended for 
implementation in 2005. The overall goal of the changes is to 
make the risk weights, which determine how much capital 
banks have to hold against various kinds of assets and off-
balance-sheet items, more risk-sensitive. The current 
“buckets” are somewhat crude,13 and this can lead to 
regulatory arbitrage, for example, through securitization or  
lending to costumers whose capital charge is too low relative to 
the risk involved. Some of the proposed changes involve 
making the risk weight dependent on the rating of borrowers. 
The rating could either be external, when the borrower has 
been evaluated by a rating agency, or, for sophisticated banks, 
internal, that is, based on the bank’s own credit risk model.14
In light of the above discussion, an interesting question is 
what consequences the recently proposed changes would have 
for the monetary transmission mechanism and macro-
economic stability. It would be outside the scope of this paper 
to give anything close to a complete answer to this question. It 
would also be very hard to do at this early stage. Instead, I 
merely venture to offer some speculative thoughts.
The more sophisticated risk weights have a clear advantage 
in ensuring that riskier banks have more equity, and this may 
reduce the risk of banking crises. However, as Jeremy Stein 
points out in his commentary on this paper, a potential 
disadvantage may be that the capital charge for a given 
portfolio of assets is likely to be countercyclical, as borrowers 
are downgraded during recessions, leading to higher capital 
requirements.15 Thus, banks may have to scramble for equity 
during a recession—arguably not the best time to build up 
capital. The danger is that the more risk-sensitive capital 
requirements will act as “automatic destabilizers”: higher 
capital requirements may lead banks to cut back on lending 
even more than usual during recessions.
What would the consequences be for the monetary 
transmission mechanism? If a monetary tightening causes a 
slowdown, borrowers are likely to be downgraded, leading to 
higher capital requirements. Hence, the bank capital channel is 
likely to be amplified: not only will bank equity be lower in the 
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maintain capital adequacy, as risk-weighted assets increase.
Of course, increased effectiveness of monetary policy is not 
necessarily undesirable. The years close to the implementation 
of the new Basle Accord, however, might be characterized by 
increased uncertainty about the effects of monetary policy, as 
banks and monetary authorities adjust to the new regulatory 
environment.
How strongly these concerns will manifest themselves will 
greatly depend on the details of “Basle 2,” which are still under 
discussion. The potential for automatic destabilization can be 
minimized by defining the ratings in such a way that they 
respond smoothly to economic conditions. This could be 
achieved by choosing a long horizon for the evaluation of credit 
risk, preferably one that includes the possibility of a recession. 
An alternative approach would be to index the capital charge for 
a loan with a given rating to aggregate economic conditions, 
decreasing it when conditions worsen. In this way, risk-
weighted assets could remain approximately the same during 
recessions for a typical bank, despite the inevitable decline in 
ratings.Endnotes
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1. Syron (1991). See also Bernanke and Lown (1991).
2. See Sharpe (1995) for an overview of the literature on this episode. 
In his judgment, the research has been less successful in determining 
whether this association is due to a causal effect of bank capital on loan 
supply because of the difficulty in distinguishing between loan 
demand and loan supply. Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (forthcoming) 
tackle this identification problem by using a matched sample of 
individual loans, borrowers, and banks. They find that higher bank 
capital lowers the rate charged on loans, even after controlling for 
borrower characteristics, other bank characteristics, and loan contract 
terms.
3. Exceptions are Bernanke and Lown (1991), Thakor (1996), Bolton 
and Freixas (2000), and the citations mentioned below in the context 
of the bank lending channel.
4. There may also be interesting connections between capital 
requirements and the volume of demand deposits, which are part of 
the money supply. Diamond and Rajan’s (2000) work suggests that 
capital requirements may inhibit a bank’s ability to create liquidity. 
This avenue is not pursued here.
5. In fact, strictly speaking, there is no reason for banks to even exist 
in a Modigliani-Miller world, as firms could borrow directly from 
households.
6. For an overview of the theory and empirical evidence relating to the 
bank lending channel, see Kashyap and Stein (1994). Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) provide a statement of the lending channel in terms of 
an IS/LM-type model. Stein (1998) gives a “micro-founded” adverse 
selection model of bank asset and liability management that generates 
a lending channel. See also Kashyap and Stein (2000).
7. For output effects, other necessary conditions are that some 
borrowers cannot find perfect substitutes for bank loans (that is, the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem must fail for some nonfinancial firms as 
well as for banks) and the presence of some nominal rigidity. See the 
citations in endnote 6 for a discussion of these conditions. In addition, 
in its standard formulation, a final necessary condition for the 
existence of a lending channel is, of course, that reserve requirements 
are binding. In reality, many countries do not have legal reserve 
requirements and even in the United States they are not binding for 
many banks. However, as long as reserves are crucial to the production 
of demand deposits, there will effectively be a “technological” reserve 
requirement.
8. Competition for deposits, combined with an interbank market for 
reserves, makes it unlikely that the deposit outflow will be equal, 
because the low-equity bank will turn out to have a greater incentive 
to retain reservable deposits. However, Stein’s (1998) analysis shows 
that even perfect interbank competition for deposits will not undo the 
conclusion.
9. The benefits of being well-capitalized, as opposed to merely being 
“adequately capitalized,” include the ability to use brokered deposits 
under the FDICIA and to become a financial services holding 
company and engage in expanded activities under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act. Being well capitalized also affects a bank’s “CAMELS” 
rating.
10. See Ramos (1996). His explanation for this observation is that the 
Great Depression left banks undercapitalized, so banks chose to 
increase their holdings of liquid assets to calm depositors’ fears. 
Issuing new equity was deemed too expensive, according to Ramos.
11. This is not true for a leverage ratio requirement, which applies to 
total assets, not risk-weighted assets. Banks can lower their leverage-
based capital requirements by selling securities.
12. Hence, in the context of the lending channel, some other friction, 
such as a liquidity premium, needs to be invoked to explain why small-
denomination CDs are not the dominant form of bank financing. See 
Stein (1998).
13. For example, all loans to the nonbank private sector except 
residential mortgages have the same risk weight, 100 percent.
14.The internal-models approach is already used as an alternative 
for capital charges stemming from the banks’ trading books. See 
Hirtle et al. (2001) for some of the issues that arise when using 
credit risk models for wider regulatory purposes.
15. All the credit goes to Jeremy Stein for thinking of this issue in the 
context of the bank capital channel.References
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2002 265
Bernanke, Ben S., and Alan S. Blinder. 1988. “Credit, Money, and 
Aggregate Demand.” American Economic Review 78, no. 2 
(May): 435-9. Papers and Proceedings of the 100th Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association.
Bernanke, Ben S., and Cara S. Lown. 1991. “The Credit Crunch.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2: 205-39.
Bolton, Patrick, and Xavier Freixas. 2000. “Corporate Finance and the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism.” Unpublished paper, 
Princeton University.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Raghuram G. Rajan. 2000. “A Theory of 
Bank Capital.” Journal of Finance 55, no. 6 (December): 
2431-65.
Friedman, Benjamin. 1991. Comment on “The Credit Crunch,”
by Ben S. Bernanke and Cara S. Lown. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, no. 2: 240-7.
Hirtle, Beverly J., Mark Levonian, Marc Saidenberg, Stefan Walter, and 
David Wright. 2001. “Using Credit Risk Models for Regulatory 
Capital: Issues and Options.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Economic Policy Review 7, no. 1 (March): 19-36.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Kenneth N. Kuttner, and Darius N. Palia. 
Forthcoming. “Are There ‘Bank Effects’ in Borrowers’ Costs of 
Funds? Evidence from a Matched Sample of Borrowers and 
Banks.” Journal of Business.
Kashyap, Anil K., and Jeremy C. Stein. 1994. “Monetary Policy and 
Bank Lending.” In Gregory N. Mankiw, ed., Monetary Policy, 
Studies in Business Cycles, 221-56. Vol. 29. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
———. 1995. “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Bank Balance 
Sheets.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy 42: 151-95.
———. 2000. “What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about 
the Transmission of Monetary Policy?” American Economic 
Review 90, no. 3 (June): 407-28.
Lown, Cara S., and Donald P. Morgan. 2002. “Credit Effects in the 
Monetary Mechanism.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Economic Policy Review 8, no. 1 (May): 217-35.
Ramos, Alberto M. 1996. “Deposit Insurance, Bank Capital Structures 
and the Demand for Liquidity.” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Issues in Financial Regulation Working Paper no. WP-96-8.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 1990. “New Evidence on the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, no. 1: 149-213.
Sharpe, Steven A. 1995. “Bank Capitalization, Regulation, and the 
Credit Crunch: A Critical Review of the Research Findings.” Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series no. 95-20.
Stein, Jeremy C. 1998. “An Adverse Selection Model of Bank Asset and 
Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of 
Monetary Policy.” RAND Journal of Economics 29, no. 3:
466-86.
Syron, Richard F. 1991. “Are We Experiencing a Credit Crunch?” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston New England Economic 
Review, July/August: 3-10.
Thakor, Anjan V. 1996. “Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and 
Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence.” 
Journal of Finance 51, no. 1: 279-324.
Van den Heuvel, Skander J. 2001. “The Bank Capital Channel of 
Monetary Policy.” Unpublished paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
Available at <http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~vdheuvel/>.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
or the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides no warranty, express or implied, as to the 
accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for any particular purpose of any information contained in 
documents produced and provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in any form or manner whatsoever.